{
  "answer": "The response design must compare the harm of acting with the harm of waiting, use independent corroboration, preserve safety systems, prefer reversible containment, simulate physical consequences, and automatically stop escalation when confidence or system state leaves the approved envelope.",
  "canonicalUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/questions/how-should-false-positives-be-managed-in-nuclear-ot/",
  "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL",
  "correctionStatus": "CURRENT K05 RELEASE",
  "id": "K01-ANSWER-089",
  "lastReviewed": "2026-08-16",
  "question": "How should false positives be managed in nuclear and other high-consequence OT?",
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "researchCutoff": "2026-08-16",
  "shortAnswer": "The response design must compare the harm of acting with the harm of waiting, use independent corroboration, preserve safety systems, prefer reversible containment, simulate physical consequences, and automatically stop escalation when confidence or system state leaves the approved envelope.",
  "slug": "how-should-false-positives-be-managed-in-nuclear-ot",
  "sourceRevalidatedAt": "2026-08-15T23:00:00Z",
  "status": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL",
  "topic": "cyber-physical-mission-assurance",
  "type": "Question"
}