{
  "argument": "No single model or sensor should convert uncertain perception into destructive action, and technical confidence does not create legal authority.",
  "canonicalUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/assurance-case/claims/sensor-and-model-disagreement-does-not-control-force/",
  "claim": "Physical-security autonomy separates sensing, classification, access denial, non-destructive protection, authorized responder routing, and any force-enabled response into independently governed layers.",
  "defeaters": [
    "single-sensor dependency",
    "unknown object class",
    "compromised clock",
    "adversarial input",
    "missing authority",
    "unsafe collateral envelope"
  ],
  "evidenceRequirements": [
    "multi-sensor confidence record",
    "sensor-health evidence",
    "disagreement policy",
    "access-control tests",
    "authorized responder interface",
    "force-authority record where applicable",
    "runtime assurance tests"
  ],
  "hazards": [
    "misclassification",
    "harm to authorized personnel",
    "airspace interference",
    "fratricide",
    "unauthorized force"
  ],
  "id": "AC-K05-C06",
  "name": "Sensor and model disagreement cannot directly control force",
  "recoveryObjectives": [
    "degrade to tracking and delay",
    "notify authorized responder",
    "preserve sensor evidence",
    "disable suspect actuator path"
  ],
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "siteTailoring": [
    "site perimeter",
    "airspace environment",
    "public access",
    "authorized federal support",
    "local emergency response"
  ],
  "slug": "sensor-and-model-disagreement-does-not-control-force",
  "sourceIds": [
    "SRC-DODD-3000-09",
    "SRC-FAA-CI-UAS-NPRM-2026",
    "SRC-USC-6-124N",
    "SRC-USC-47-333"
  ]
}