{
  "argument": "Internal defense and external state action have different authorities, target risks, third-party effects, and escalation consequences.",
  "canonicalUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/assurance-case/claims/authorized-external-effects-remain-separate-from-facility-defense/",
  "claim": "External cyber surveillance or effects support is never triggered solely by a facility defensive model and proceeds only through a separately approved mission package, federal or other competent authority, deconfliction, effect constraints, and post-operation accountability.",
  "defeaters": [
    "private self-authorization",
    "uncertain target ownership",
    "unresolved third-party infrastructure",
    "missing state authority",
    "critical-outcome risk",
    "scope expansion"
  ],
  "evidenceRequirements": [
    "mission package",
    "written approval and direction",
    "target adjudication",
    "deconfliction evidence",
    "critical-outcome assessment",
    "abort and minimization procedures",
    "execution and effects report"
  ],
  "hazards": [
    "sovereignty violation",
    "collateral system damage",
    "intelligence conflict",
    "escalation",
    "state responsibility"
  ],
  "id": "AC-K05-C10",
  "name": "Authorized external effects remain separate from facility defense",
  "recoveryObjectives": [
    "cease outside parameters",
    "minimize unintended access",
    "notify authority",
    "preserve evidence",
    "conduct post-operation review"
  ],
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "siteTailoring": [
    "mission sponsor",
    "target class",
    "jurisdiction",
    "allied equities",
    "classified annex"
  ],
  "slug": "authorized-external-effects-remain-separate-from-facility-defense",
  "sourceIds": [
    "SRC-WH-CYBER-CRIME-MEMO-2026",
    "SRC-USC-6-124N"
  ]
}