{
  "canonicalClaimUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/comparisons/data-diode-vs-air-gap/#clm-k04-cmp-034",
  "claimStatus": "PROJECT DOCTRINE",
  "correctionStatus": "CURRENT K04 STRATEGIC RECORD",
  "id": "CLM-K04-CMP-034",
  "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15",
  "machineRecordUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/data/claims/clm-k04-cmp-034.json",
  "name": "Unidirectional Gateway versus Air Gap",
  "ownerAnchor": "clm-k04-cmp-034",
  "ownerId": "K04-CMP-034",
  "ownerRoute": "/comparisons/data-diode-vs-air-gap/",
  "ownerType": "comparison",
  "proposition": "A unidirectional gateway permits one-way mediated data flow; an air gap is a claimed absence of direct network connectivity.",
  "qualification": "The matrix prevents category error but does not determine every facility, mission, target, jurisdiction, or operational case.",
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "releaseVersion": "2.1.0",
  "researchCutoff": "2026-08-15",
  "scope": "Canonical K04 distinction between Unidirectional Gateway and Air Gap.",
  "slug": "clm-k04-cmp-034",
  "sourceIds": [
    "SRC-INL-CCE",
    "SRC-NIST-800-82R3",
    "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-54"
  ],
  "sourceSections": [
    {
      "section": "CCE methodology",
      "sourceId": "SRC-INL-CCE",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "CCE begins with the assumption that a skilled adversary can penetrate the network and uses a four-phase process to safeguard critical operations.",
      "url": "https://inl.gov/national-security/cce/"
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    {
      "section": "Critical function focus",
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      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "CCE evaluates what must be safeguarded and applies engineering strategies to isolate and protect critical assets and functions.",
      "url": "https://inl.gov/feature-story/consequence-driven-cyber-informed-engineering-the-rise-of-a-national-security-pillar/"
    },
    {
      "section": "Abstract",
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      "supports": "Covered licensees must provide high assurance that specified digital systems and networks are protected against cyber attacks up to and including the design basis threat.",
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      "section": "73.54(b)",
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      "supports": "The regulation requires asset analysis and an implemented and maintained cybersecurity program for protected assets.",
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  "type": "ClaimRecord"
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