{
  "canonicalClaimUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/questions/how-should-counter-uas-be-positioned-for-critical-infrastructure/#clm-k04-q-093",
  "claimStatus": "PROJECT DOCTRINE",
  "correctionStatus": "CURRENT K04 STRATEGIC RECORD",
  "id": "CLM-K04-Q-093",
  "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15",
  "machineRecordUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/data/claims/clm-k04-q-093.json",
  "name": "How should counter-UAS capability be positioned for critical infrastructure?",
  "ownerAnchor": "clm-k04-q-093",
  "ownerId": "K04-Q-093",
  "ownerRoute": "/questions/how-should-counter-uas-be-positioned-for-critical-infrastructure/",
  "ownerType": "question",
  "proposition": "As a layered sensing, classification, tracking, evidence, delay, and authority-integration capability. Detection does not itself authorize jamming or destruction, so the system must distinguish awareness, non-destructive protection, and any separately authorized mitigation.",
  "qualification": "The answer remains bounded by the owning topic, exact authority, safety, jurisdiction, evidence, and readiness state.",
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "releaseVersion": "2.1.0",
  "researchCutoff": "2026-08-15",
  "scope": "Direct answer for How should counter-UAS capability be positioned for critical infrastructure?",
  "slug": "clm-k04-q-093",
  "sourceIds": [
    "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-55",
    "SRC-NRC-ADVANCED-REACTOR-PHYSICAL-SECURITY",
    "SRC-DODD-3000-09"
  ],
  "sourceSections": [
    {
      "section": "General performance objective and requirements",
      "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-55",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "Nuclear power reactor licensees must establish and maintain a physical protection program against radiological sabotage with defined detection, assessment, delay, and response functions.",
      "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-10/chapter-I/part-73/section-73.55"
    },
    {
      "section": "Alternative requirements overview",
      "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-ADVANCED-REACTOR-PHYSICAL-SECURITY",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "The NRC considered technology-inclusive, risk-informed, performance-based alternatives for advanced-reactor physical protection.",
      "url": "https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2425/ML24254A350.pdf"
    },
    {
      "section": "Onsite responder alternatives",
      "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-ADVANCED-REACTOR-PHYSICAL-SECURITY",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "Supporting materials discuss conditions under which the minimum number of onsite armed responders could be reduced, including potentially to zero, subject to the rule and facility showing.",
      "url": "https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2417/ML24178A370.pdf"
    },
    {
      "section": "Policy 1.2(a)-(b)",
      "sourceId": "SRC-DODD-3000-09",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must allow appropriate human judgment over force and undergo rigorous verification, validation, testing, cybersecurity, and lawful use.",
      "url": "https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.PDF"
    },
    {
      "section": "Responsibilities and testing",
      "sourceId": "SRC-DODD-3000-09",
      "supportRelationship": "QUALIFIES OR SUPPORTS WITHIN STATED SCOPE",
      "supports": "The directive assigns approval, legal review, test, monitoring, operator understanding, abort, and post-fielding responsibilities.",
      "url": "https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.PDF"
    }
  ],
  "type": "ClaimRecord"
}