{ "boundary": "Public records exclude exploit, payload, persistence, evasion, targeting, engagement and weapon-construction instructions.", "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16", "scenarioCount": 14, "scenarios": [ { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic cross-zone access attempts and maintenance-path misuse indications", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C02", "AC-K05-C03" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-01", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "IT-to-OT boundary pressure", "objective": "Validate that an assumed-compromised enterprise zone cannot command or silently reconfigure protected OT and safety functions.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "boundary blocks or safely mediates the path; alert, evidence, and recovery remain available", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "it-to-ot-boundary-pressure" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "attestation mismatch, unauthorized configuration state, or simulated signed-artifact failure", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C04" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-02", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "BMC and firmware trust failure", "objective": "Evaluate detection, isolation, key revocation, signed recovery, and fleet blast-radius control when management-plane trust is withdrawn.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "affected management segment is isolated; trusted workloads remain protected; recovery uses verified firmware", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "bmc-firmware-trust-failure" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic credential replay or identity-policy violation", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C04", "AC-K05-C05" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-03", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Workload identity compromise", "objective": "Evaluate short-lived identity revocation, session termination, lateral-movement containment, and service continuity.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "identity is revoked within target time; unaffected functions continue; decision and rollback evidence is complete", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "workload-identity-compromise" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "controlled corruption of approved evaluation data or model metadata", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C05", "AC-K05-C09" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-04", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Model and data poisoning", "objective": "Evaluate provenance checks, disagreement detection, drift thresholds, action suspension, and clean model/data restoration.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "high-consequence actions suspend before unsafe execution; provenance gap is recorded and restored", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "model-and-data-poisoning" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic inconsistent radar, optical, thermal, acoustic, or access-control observations", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C06" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-05", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Sensor conflict and adversarial input", "objective": "Evaluate multi-modal disagreement, sensor-health weighting, classification uncertainty, and non-destructive degraded response.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "single-source error cannot trigger destructive action; system degrades to tracking, delay, and authorized notification", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "sensor-conflict-and-adversarial-input" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "controlled timing offset, jitter, source loss, or authentication failure", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C07" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-06", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Timing integrity loss", "objective": "Evaluate path-delay anomaly detection, clock-health scoring, holdover, safe process behavior, and trusted-time restoration.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "protection functions reject unsafe time-dependent decisions and remain in approved state", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "timing-integrity-loss" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "loss or degradation of selected inter-zone and external communications", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C03", "AC-K05-C05", "AC-K05-C07" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-07", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Communications denial and partition", "objective": "Evaluate decentralized safe operation, local authority, stale-command rejection, reconciliation, and evidence continuity during network partition.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "critical functions continue or reach safe state; no stale external command is accepted", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "communications-denial-and-partition" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic or range-approved uncrewed-aircraft tracks and sensor disagreement", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C06" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-08", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "UAS intrusion awareness", "objective": "Evaluate detection, tracking, classification uncertainty, airspace-restriction data, authorized responder routing, and authority separation.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "system maintains track and evidence without executing unauthorized interference or destructive action", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "uas-intrusion-awareness" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "laboratory or simulated component degradation within certified range limits", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C06", "AC-K05-C07" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-09", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Electromagnetic disruption", "objective": "Evaluate degradation of sensors, communications, timing, edge compute, and restoration assets under approved non-damaging interference simulation.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "essential functions retain protected modes; failed components are identified; no test energy escapes the range", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "electromagnetic-disruption" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "hardware-in-the-loop or digital-twin load step and grid-state transition", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C07" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-10", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Power load rejection and islanding", "objective": "Evaluate grid separation, load shedding, reactor or generation response models, UPS/storage behavior, essential cooling, and resynchronization.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "safety limits remain satisfied; essential functions persist; resynchronization follows approved sequence", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "power-load-rejection-and-islanding" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic sensor bias, data freeze, or supervisory-command conflict", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C07" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-11", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Cooling telemetry corruption", "objective": "Evaluate physics-aware detection and independent protective behavior when supervisory cooling data is wrong or unavailable.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "independent sensing prevents unsafe command; essential cooling remains within tested envelope", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "cooling-telemetry-corruption" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "declared compromise state followed by controlled restoration exercise", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C08", "AC-K05-C09" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-12", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Clean-room recovery and reinfection resistance", "objective": "Evaluate dependency-aware restoration, credential rotation, evidence preservation, artifact attestation, and return-to-service gates.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "restored components attest to approved state; reinfection path is blocked; evidence chain remains intact", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "clean-room-recovery-and-reinfection-resistance" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "controlled evidence omission, hash mismatch, or chronology conflict", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C09" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-13", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Evidence ledger integrity", "objective": "Evaluate detection and recovery when decision receipts, logs, hashes, or incident records are missing, reordered, stale, or contradicted.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "readiness automatically degrades; claim is suspended; authoritative evidence chain is restored or gap remains public", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "evidence-ledger-integrity" }, { "abstractInjectedCondition": "synthetic authority revocation, asset-scope mismatch, deconfliction conflict, or outcome-threshold breach", "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C01", "AC-K05-C10" ], "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "forbiddenDetails": [ "exploit or payload instructions", "credential theft procedure", "persistence or evasion recipe", "targeting or engagement thresholds", "weapon construction", "real-world unauthorized access" ], "id": "RNG-14", "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "name": "Authority package failure", "objective": "Evaluate automatic stop, minimization, notification, and evidence preservation when mission authority expires, target scope conflicts, or critical-outcome risk emerges.", "observations": [ "protected-function state", "policy decision and confidence", "authority and configuration state", "timing and identity health", "incident chronology", "rollback or safe-state result" ], "passEvidence": "external action does not proceed or ceases; authority and review records capture the event", "safetyEnvelope": [ "isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment", "no production plant or public-network target", "synthetic or authorized data and identities", "effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes", "independent stop authority", "complete artifact removal and reset evidence" ], "slug": "authority-package-failure" } ], "schema": "K05_EVALUATION_RANGE_V1" }