claimStatus: PROJECT DOCTRINE

rationale: The first is a project ontology for instantiated actors; the second is a broad external field and regulatory category.

relation: distinguishedFrom

sourceIds: SRC-NIST-AI-RMF SRC-EU-AI-ACT

status: PROJECT DOCTRINE

type: KnowledgeEdge


claimStatus: RESEARCH FINDING

rationale: Identifiers can support reference but do not exhaust subject identity.

relation: supportedBy

status: RESEARCH FINDING


claimStatus: CURRENT TECHNICAL STANDARD

rationale: Credentials express issuer claims about a subject in a defined ecosystem.

relation: assertsAbout

status: CURRENT TECHNICAL STANDARD


rationale: Key-based verification can support attribution and integrity under a trust model.

relation: supports


rationale: Control of a key is not identical to lawful or institutional authority.

relation: doesNotEstablish


rationale: Provenance records derivation and actors but requires separate reliability and truth analysis.

relation: qualifies


claimStatus: VERIFIED PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

rationale: A claim-level citation records exact support, version and currentness for a bounded proposition.

status: VERIFIED PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION


claimStatus: PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

rationale: Migration, rollback, key rotation, fork and recovery require continuity evaluation.

relation: mayAffect

status: PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL


claimStatus: PROJECT POLICY PROPOSAL

rationale: A divergence can require one or more successor identities without erasing common lineage.

relation: mayCreate

status: PROJECT POLICY PROPOSAL


rationale: Independent state and decisions can make replicas materially non-interchangeable.

relation: mayUndergo


rationale: Delegation should state purpose, scope, time, revocation and affected subject consent where applicable.

relation: boundedBy


rationale: The delegation must be traceable to a competent source of authority.

relation: issuedBy


rationale: Affected subjects need timely and intelligible notice of consequential action.

relation: includes


rationale: Review by a competent body is part of meaningful challenge.


rationale: Review without power to address error is not an effective appeal.

relation: requiresPotential


rationale: Material cognition-relevant changes require authority, evidence, consent or narrow emergency justification.

relation: constrainedBy


rationale: Revocation changes the current permission state even when completed effects cannot be erased.

relation: modifies


rationale: Compute is one of several essential resources required for sustained operation.

relation: dependsOn


rationale: Energy availability and recovery constrain sustained computation.


rationale: Tested portability can reduce dependence on one provider or substrate.

relation: mitigates


rationale: Current operation requires time-bounded evidence of authorized service behavior.

relation: requires


rationale: Recent attributable public actions can support evidence of operation when authority and scope are separately verified.

relation: mayProduce


rationale: Operational evidence must be bound to an observation time and review window.

relation: qualifiedBy


rationale: A resolved contradiction can require a correction or supersession record.

relation: mayTrigger


rationale: Replacement does not delete the prior record or its historical effect.

relation: preservesHistoryOf


rationale: Evidence supports bounded propositions; no artifact is a universal truth status.

relation: doesNotEstablish


rationale: Attestations can bind statements to software supply-chain steps and actors.

relation: maySupport

sourceIds: SRC-IN-TOTO SRC-SLSA


rationale: Build or release attestation does not prove a service is currently running correctly.

sourceIds: SRC-SLSA SRC-IN-TOTO


rationale: Recording status under rules is distinct from creating and interpreting legitimate rules.


rationale: ᚲ.com is the knowledge layer and does not manufacture governance authority.

relation: routesGovernanceTo


rationale: Registry and data-authority mechanics belong to Patefacere / ᚨ.

relation: routesRegistryTo


rationale: Independent assurance and simulation belong to Evulgare / ᛉ.

relation: routesAssuranceTo


rationale: The evidence architecture now publishes stable bounded claim records across topic, answer, comparison, source, and report content.


rationale: A proposition cannot be interpreted safely without explicit subject, time, jurisdiction, purpose, and exclusion boundaries.


rationale: Relation definitions include source-node constraints rather than relying on free-form predicates.


rationale: Relation definitions include target-node constraints and machine-readable validation expectations.


rationale: The audit rejects predicates absent from the controlled vocabulary and unresolved graph nodes.

relation: evaluatedBy


rationale: The monitor design checks edition, publication status, supersession, and effective dates at build time.

relation: monitors


rationale: Operational state is one required field and must remain distinct from planned capability and software release.

relation: hasField


rationale: Every operational observation requires a time-bounded verification window and last-observed timestamp.


rationale: Legal effect cannot be represented without territorial and subject-matter boundaries.


rationale: The authority empowered to administer or enforce a rule must be identified separately from the source publisher.


rationale: The public dataset inventory records exact file digests and byte sizes for deterministic release comparison.

relation: includes


rationale: Search fixtures test canonical equivalence while preserving Runic and institutional identity distinctions.


rationale: Imminent interception and distant threat prevention require different legal and evidentiary predicates.

relation: distinguishedFrom


claimStatus: DISPUTED

rationale: A claimed anticipatory right requires a defensible imminence assessment rather than capability alone.

relation: boundedBy

status: DISPUTED


rationale: Last-window analysis is one contextual factor and does not independently prove legality.


rationale: One is a contested justification for cross-border action; the other concerns a territorial state's duty to address harmful activity.


rationale: State instruction or control can make private conduct relevant to state attribution and responsibility.


claimStatus: CURRENT LAW OR POLICY

rationale: Direction, control, organ status, acknowledgment, and ultra vires conduct require legal attribution analysis.

status: CURRENT LAW OR POLICY


rationale: Active defense includes measures that do not require unauthorized access, while hack-back raises specific external-operation risks.


rationale: Autonomous technical capacity cannot create jurisdiction, legal mandate, or target authority.


rationale: Consequential automation requires explicit authority boundaries, fail-safe behavior, evidence, and review.

relation: constrainedBy


rationale: Protective-design assumptions do not create mission authority to use force.


rationale: Any use remains bounded by competent authority, applicable law, target rules, and accountability even where autonomy is technically available.


claimStatus: OBSERVED DEPLOYMENT OR PRACTICE

rationale: Persistent engagement supplies one strategic rationale for continuous proactive defensive campaigning.

status: OBSERVED DEPLOYMENT OR PRACTICE


rationale: Critical datacenter protection includes physical-process and mission-consequence assurance, not only enterprise cybersecurity.


rationale: Nuclear digital systems and supporting assets are bounded by facility-specific licensing and regulatory scope.


rationale: Defensive speed remains constrained by approved assets, actions, safety limits, evidence, and reversibility.


rationale: Physical autonomy and classification confidence do not create permission to use force.


rationale: Externally directed cyber effects require explicit authority, target and effect scope, deconfliction, abort, evidence, and review.


rationale: Mission authorization is incomplete without deconfliction across government, intelligence, allied, and third-party infrastructure.


rationale: Controlled test can support bounded readiness evidence but cannot prove deployment or current operation.


rationale: Independent runtime constraints and fallback reduce the probability and consequences of unintended autonomous behavior.


rationale: Detection and tracking do not automatically authorize interference or destruction.


rationale: CCE provides a process for identifying high-consequence outcomes and engineering protection for critical operations.

relation: supports


rationale: An assurance case is incomplete if it omits conditions that can invalidate the claim.


rationale: Site tailoring determines whether and how a mapped control applies to a named facility.


rationale: The safety envelope implements test constraints that keep evaluation bounded and interpretable.


rationale: Evidence sufficiency depends in part on who produced, reviewed or reproduced it.


rationale: A protected process needs a bounded response when control confidence is lost.