{
  "aliases": [],
  "canonicalUrl": "https://xn--mwe.com/assurance-case/common-cause/",
  "claimIds": [],
  "claimStatus": "VERIFIED PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION",
  "correctionStatus": "CURRENT K05 RELEASE",
  "currentnessQualification": "K05 point-in-time review of selected current official and first-party records completed on 2026-08-15. The review verifies publication text and status only; no public runtime monitor, live-host observation, facility-specific legal opinion, license determination, or operational effectiveness claim is created.",
  "description": "Eight composed traces and abstract minimal cut sets spanning power, cooling, identity, management, supply chain, recovery, protocol, and observation dependencies.",
  "id": "K10-PAGE-COMMON-CAUSE",
  "lastReviewed": "2026-08-16",
  "name": "Common-Cause Assurance Analysis",
  "publicPath": "/assurance-case/common-cause/",
  "releaseId": "K12-2026-08-16",
  "releaseVersion": "2.1.0",
  "researchCutoff": "2026-08-16",
  "shortAnswer": "K10 exposes how degraded trusted time, unavailable supplier evidence, or stale recovery evidence can affect multiple mission traces at once, while excluding protected configuration and actionable attack paths.",
  "sourceRevalidatedAt": "2026-08-15T23:00:00Z",
  "title": "Common-Cause Assurance Analysis",
  "topic": "cyber-physical-mission-assurance",
  "type": "common-cause-assurance"
}