[ { "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C01", "AC-K05-C10" ], "authorityBoundary": "Control design and mapping do not create mission authority, license approval, certification, or universal applicability.", "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "failureEvidence": [ "missing or stale artifact", "control bypass", "unresolved defect", "scope mismatch", "unsupported compliance label", "unavailable operating evidence" ], "family": "Governance", "id": "GOV-01", "implementationEvidence": [ "approved design and scope", "exact configuration or policy artifact", "test result", "defect and exception record", "operating observation where deployment is claimed", "last review and evidence owner" ], "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "mappings": [ { "applicability": "Applies as guidance when OT is in scope; Revision 3 remains final while Revision 4 is under development.", "framework": "NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "OT security program, architecture, risk, and control guidance", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-NIST-800-82R3" }, { "applicability": "Applies to identity- and resource-centric access design; 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Revision 3 remains final while Revision 4 is under development.", "framework": "NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "OT security program, architecture, risk, and control guidance", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-NIST-800-82R3" }, { "applicability": "Applies to identity- and resource-centric access design; does not replace OT safety analysis.", "framework": "NIST SP 800-207", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "Zero Trust Architecture principles", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-NIST-800-207" }, { "applicability": "Useful for high-consequence pathway analysis; not a regulatory certification.", "framework": "INL Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "Consequence prioritization and critical-function assurance", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-INL-CCE" }, { "applicability": "Only for an NRC-regulated facility within the selected licensing and security framework; license basis controls.", "framework": "NRC 10 CFR Part 73", "quality": "PARTIAL_IMPLEMENTATION_SUPPORT", "reference": "73.54/73.55 or 73.100/73.110/73.120 as selected and applicable", "relationship": "MAY IMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT", "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-SUBPART-J-2026" } ], "name": "Physics-informed detection", "objective": "Cross-check cyber telemetry against process invariants and independent measurements so statistically plausible but physically unsafe data is rejected.", "researchCutoff": "2026-08-15", "slug": "physics-informed-detection" }, { "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C03", "AC-K05-C07" ], "authorityBoundary": "Control design and mapping do not create mission authority, license approval, certification, or universal applicability.", "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "failureEvidence": [ "missing or stale artifact", "control bypass", "unresolved defect", "scope mismatch", "unsupported compliance label", "unavailable operating evidence" ], "family": "OT/Nuclear", "id": "OT-03", "implementationEvidence": [ "approved design and scope", "exact configuration or policy artifact", "test result", "defect and exception record", "operating observation where deployment is claimed", "last review and evidence owner" ], "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "mappings": [ { "applicability": "Applies as guidance when OT is in scope; Revision 3 remains final while Revision 4 is under development.", "framework": "NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "OT security program, architecture, risk, and control guidance", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-NIST-800-82R3" }, { "applicability": "Applies to identity- and resource-centric access design; does not replace OT safety analysis.", "framework": "NIST SP 800-207", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "Zero Trust Architecture principles", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-NIST-800-207" }, { "applicability": "Useful for high-consequence pathway analysis; not a regulatory certification.", "framework": "INL Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering", "quality": "INFORMATIVE_RELATIONSHIP", "reference": "Consequence prioritization and critical-function assurance", "relationship": "INFORMS", "sourceId": "SRC-INL-CCE" }, { "applicability": "Only for an NRC-regulated facility within the selected licensing and security framework; license basis controls.", "framework": "NRC 10 CFR Part 73", "quality": "PARTIAL_IMPLEMENTATION_SUPPORT", "reference": "73.54/73.55 or 73.100/73.110/73.120 as selected and applicable", "relationship": "MAY IMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT", "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-SUBPART-J-2026" } ], "name": "Independent safe-state path", "objective": "Provide an approved path to safe state that does not depend on the suspect enterprise network, model, identity provider, or timing source.", "researchCutoff": "2026-08-15", "slug": "independent-safe-state-path" }, { "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C07" ], "authorityBoundary": "Control design and mapping do not create mission authority, license approval, certification, or universal applicability.", "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "failureEvidence": [ "missing or stale artifact", "control bypass", "unresolved defect", "scope mismatch", "unsupported compliance label", "unavailable operating evidence" ], "family": "Power/Cooling", "id": "PWR-01", "implementationEvidence": [ "approved design and scope", "exact configuration or policy artifact", "test result", "defect and exception record", "operating observation where deployment is claimed", "last review and evidence owner" ], "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "mappings": [ { "applicability": "Applies as guidance when OT is in scope; 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license basis controls.", "framework": "NRC 10 CFR Part 73", "quality": "PARTIAL_IMPLEMENTATION_SUPPORT", "reference": "73.54/73.55 or 73.100/73.110/73.120 as selected and applicable", "relationship": "MAY IMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT", "sourceId": "SRC-NRC-10CFR-73-SUBPART-J-2026" }, { "applicability": "Only after BES registration, asset categorization, effective-date, and enforcement-jurisdiction analysis.", "framework": "NERC CIP", "quality": "PARTIAL_IMPLEMENTATION_SUPPORT", "reference": "Current applicable CIP standards and implementation plans", "relationship": "MAY IMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT", "sourceId": "SRC-NERC-CIP-CATALOG-2026" } ], "name": "Load-rejection and islanding assurance", "objective": "Model and test credible load steps, islanding, resynchronization, black-start dependencies, and fail-safe load shedding.", "researchCutoff": "2026-08-15", "slug": "load-rejection-and-islanding-assurance" }, { "assuranceClaimIds": [ "AC-K05-C07" ], "authorityBoundary": "Control design and mapping do not create mission authority, license approval, certification, or universal applicability.", "claimStatus": "PROJECT TECHNICAL PROPOSAL", "failureEvidence": [ "missing or stale artifact", "control bypass", "unresolved defect", "scope mismatch", "unsupported compliance label", "unavailable operating evidence" ], "family": "Power/Cooling", "id": "CLG-01", "implementationEvidence": [ "approved design and scope", "exact configuration or policy artifact", "test result", "defect and exception record", "operating observation where deployment is claimed", "last review and evidence owner" ], "lastReviewed": "2026-08-15", "mappings": [ { "applicability": "Applies as guidance when OT is in scope; 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