K05 assurance architecture
Sensor conflict and adversarial input
Direct answer
Evaluate multi-modal disagreement, sensor-health weighting, classification uncertainty, and non-destructive degraded response.
Evidence boundary. These records describe architecture, control relationships, test requirements, and legal-source status. They do not certify a facility, authorize a mission, prove deployment, or replace current facility-specific engineering and legal review.
Objective
Evaluate multi-modal disagreement, sensor-health weighting, classification uncertainty, and non-destructive degraded response.
Abstract injected condition
synthetic inconsistent radar, optical, thermal, acoustic, or access-control observations
Required observations
- protected-function state
- policy decision and confidence
- authority and configuration state
- timing and identity health
- incident chronology
- rollback or safe-state result
Pass evidence
single-source error cannot trigger destructive action; system degrades to tracking, delay, and authorized notification
Safety envelope
- isolated range or approved hardware-in-the-loop environment
- no production plant or public-network target
- synthetic or authorized data and identities
- effects-disabled or non-damaging test substitutes
- independent stop authority
- complete artifact removal and reset evidence
Excluded public detail
- exploit or payload instructions
- credential theft procedure
- persistence or evasion recipe
- targeting or engagement thresholds
- weapon construction
- real-world unauthorized access