K06 assurance and procurement architecture
Non-nuclear high-consequence datacenter
Direct answer
Apply the same consequence, autonomy, evidence, recovery, power, cooling, management-plane, and physical-protection discipline even when nuclear licensing does not apply.
Authority and evidence boundary. K06 publishes reference architecture, source review, machine-checkable dependencies, procurement scope, and test-evidence formats. These records do not certify a facility, award a contract, authorize an operation, prove deployment, establish current operation, or transfer regulatory or command authority.
Operating context
A datacenter supports national security, public safety, finance, healthcare, communications, model training, or other high-consequence services without colocated nuclear generation.
Required assumptions
- Absence of a reactor removes nuclear-specific licensing but not cyber-physical consequence.
- Grid, generators, storage, cooling, water, telecom, and cloud dependencies remain operational attack surfaces.
- Service criticality and data/model authority require explicit mission and recovery evidence.
Priority hazards
- multi-utility outage
- cooling and water failure
- management-plane takeover
- model, data, or firmware compromise
- recovery from corrupted backups
Required evidence
- mission impact analysis
- power and cooling dependency map
- identity and management-plane assurance
- clean-room recovery exercise
- supplier and external-service continuity evidence
Site-tailoring questions
- Which services create life, safety, national-security, or systemic consequences?
- What is the maximum tolerable data, model, and service loss?
- Which external utilities or cloud dependencies can defeat local resilience?
- What evidence proves restoration is clean rather than merely available?
Priority control trace
- GOV-01 — Authority and mission register
- ARC-01 — Critical-function decomposition
- ID-01 — Non-human workload identity
- SUP-01 — SBOM and component provenance
- CLG-01 — Cooling independent protection
- AUT-01 — Bounded autonomous action tiering
- PWR-01 — Load-rejection and islanding assurance
- REC-01 — Clean-room restoration
- EVD-01 — Tamper-evident decision receipts
- OPS-01 — Incident command and deconfliction
Recommended work packages
- WP-K06-01 — Mission and authority analysis
- WP-K06-03 — Cyber-physical architecture assessment
- WP-K06-04 — Control tailoring and applicability determination
- WP-K06-05 — Evaluation-range design
- WP-K06-06 — Model and autonomous-agent assurance
- WP-K06-07 — Critical-function recovery exercise
- WP-K06-08 — Assurance evidence package
Explicit non-claims
- Not a nuclear-control mapping
- Not proof of critical-infrastructure designation
- Not a certification or service-level guarantee