Counter-UAS authority separation

Objective

Separate UAS detection and airspace restriction from interception, interference, seizure, disabling, or destruction; bind each action to actor-specific authority.

Implementation evidence

• approved design and scope
• exact configuration or policy artifact
• test result
• defect and exception record
• operating observation where deployment is claimed
• last review and evidence owner

Evidence of failure or insufficiency

• missing or stale artifact
• control bypass
• unresolved defect
• scope mismatch
• unsupported compliance label
• unavailable operating evidence

Qualified source mappings

• NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 — INFORMSOT security program, architecture, risk, and control guidance
  Applies as guidance when OT is in scope; Revision 3 remains final while Revision 4 is under development.
  Source record
• NIST SP 800-207 — INFORMSZero Trust Architecture principles
  Applies to identity- and resource-centric access design; does not replace OT safety analysis.
  Source record
• INL Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering — INFORMSConsequence prioritization and critical-function assurance
  Useful for high-consequence pathway analysis; not a regulatory certification.
  Source record
• NRC 10 CFR Part 73 — MAY IMPLEMENT OR SUPPORT73.54/73.55 or 73.100/73.110/73.120 as selected and applicable
  Only for an NRC-regulated facility within the selected licensing and security framework; license basis controls.
  Source record
• DoD Directive 3000.09 — APPLIES ONLY IF CAPABILITY IS A COVERED WEAPON SYSTEMWeapon-system applicability, human judgment, V&V/T&E, robustness, transparency, and abort behavior
  The directive expressly excludes autonomous cyberspace capabilities, unarmed platforms, and non-weapon autonomous systems.
  Source record

Assurance claims

AC-K05-C06