K05 assurance architecture
Assurance Claim Register
Direct answer
Ten assurance claims connect mission and safety propositions to evidence, defeaters, hazards, recovery objectives, source qualifications, and site-tailoring questions.
Claim collection
AC-K05-C01
Authority and mission boundary is explicit
Every automated protection action and any external mission support is traceable to a competent authority, named asset scope, allowed effects, prohibited outcomes, duration, stop conditions, and review route.
7 evidence requirements · 5 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C02
High-consequence events are identified and bounded
The facility identifies the cyber-enabled physical and mission consequences that must be prevented, their initiating pathways, critical functions, and independent protections.
6 evidence requirements · 5 defeaters · 6 hazards
AC-K05-C03
Deterministic separation protects safety functions
Safety-significant and critical OT functions cannot be commanded from lower-trust datacenter or external networks through an unverified software path.
6 evidence requirements · 5 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C04
Identity, firmware, and management planes remain trustworthy
Privileged identities, workload identities, signing keys, BMCs, firmware, update systems, model artifacts, and management networks are separately protected and continuously evidenced.
7 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C05
Autonomous defense is bounded, causal, and reversible
Autonomous defenders act only through pre-authorized internal actions whose physical consequence, confidence threshold, rollback, evidence, and safe-state behavior have been tested.
7 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C06
Sensor and model disagreement cannot directly control force
Physical-security autonomy separates sensing, classification, access denial, non-destructive protection, authorized responder routing, and any force-enabled response into independently governed layers.
7 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 5 hazards
AC-K05-C07
Power, cooling, and timing failures do not defeat protected functions
The facility can detect corrupted or unavailable power, cooling, environmental, and timing data; reject unsafe commands; and transition to approved operating states without relying on the compromised channel.
7 evidence requirements · 5 defeaters · 5 hazards
AC-K05-C08
Recovery is clean, evidenced, and repeatable
Critical services can be restored from independently protected, provenance-verified states while preserving evidence and preventing reinfection or unsafe configuration reintroduction.
8 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C09
Evidence supports readiness without overclaiming
Every public or procurement readiness state is traceable to exact releases, tests, defects, deployment identity, authority, incidents, uptime, restoration, and independent-verification status.
9 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 4 hazards
AC-K05-C10
Authorized external effects remain separate from facility defense
External cyber surveillance or effects support is never triggered solely by a facility defensive model and proceeds only through a separately approved mission package, federal or other competent authority, deconfliction, effect constraints, and post-operation accountability.
7 evidence requirements · 6 defeaters · 5 hazards