K05 assurance architecture
Authorized external effects remain separate from facility defense
Direct answer
External cyber surveillance or effects support is never triggered solely by a facility defensive model and proceeds only through a separately approved mission package, federal or other competent authority, deconfliction, effect constraints, and post-operation accountability.
Claim
External cyber surveillance or effects support is never triggered solely by a facility defensive model and proceeds only through a separately approved mission package, federal or other competent authority, deconfliction, effect constraints, and post-operation accountability.
Argument
Internal defense and external state action have different authorities, target risks, third-party effects, and escalation consequences.
Evidence requirements
- mission package
- written approval and direction
- target adjudication
- deconfliction evidence
- critical-outcome assessment
- abort and minimization procedures
- execution and effects report
Assurance defeaters
- private self-authorization
- uncertain target ownership
- unresolved third-party infrastructure
- missing state authority
- critical-outcome risk
- scope expansion
Hazards
- sovereignty violation
- collateral system damage
- intelligence conflict
- escalation
- state responsibility
Recovery objectives
- cease outside parameters
- minimize unintended access
- notify authority
- preserve evidence
- conduct post-operation review
Site-tailoring questions
- mission sponsor
- target class
- jurisdiction
- allied equities
- classified annex
Sources and record
Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime · 6 U.S.C. § 124n — Protection of Certain Facilities and Assets from Unmanned Aircraft